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ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURAL REFORM IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
Introductory thoughts on the current situation 
It was decided at the Conference of Heads of State or Government in Maastricht on 
09.–10.12.1991 to adopt a common currency in these countries. This laid the foundation 
for the European Economic and Monetary Union. This was and is intended to be a 
preliminary stage for the creation of the European political union – United States of 
Europe – according to the model of the United States of America.     
U.S. economists, above all, were sceptical about this project as a comparison of these 
two federations would reveal quite considerable differences between the countries. The 
opinion of Milton Friedman (1912–2006), the 1976 Nobel Prize Laureate, attracted 
particular attention. He referred to the fact that U.S. experience cannot be transferred to 
Europe very easily as individual European countries – unlike U.S. states – vary a lot 
both in economic and sociological terms. In the U.S. most public expenditures are born 
by the federal government so it is relatively easy in case of regional economic 
disparities to redirect sufficient aid resources to regions which are in a crisis situation. 
The labour force and officials are much more mobile between regions due to the 
common language, in principle commonly perceived culture and relatively few personal 
connections with their home states. In addition, the labour markets are much less 
regulated than in Europe. On the basis of all these factors, salaries and wages can be 
more easily adjusted to different levels of development of economic areas. The same 
applies to capital flows which can move between the states without any barriers; in 
Europe, on the other hand, different regulations have been applied.    
When the essence of the Monetary Union began to acquire a clearer shape in August 
1997 after long discussions in competent committees, Milton Friedman expressed his 
opinion in a paper that European countries should not give up the balancing impact of 
flexible currency exchange rates and independent monetary policies. He dreaded that 
introduction of the euro would increase political tensions and cause disruptive conflicts. 
That would prove to be an obstacle for the achievement of the stated goal of political 
unity. 
The current crisis seems to confirm the correctness of Milton’s statement. Due to the 
very different initial situations and developments that have taken place meanwhile in 
the different countries of the eurozone, the way to the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) and as a final goal to a political union has turned out to be 
more difficult than it was assumed at first. The institutional structures of the union that 
have developed by now have proved to be inadequate and with shortcomings. It is 
necessary to reform this project which is politically so important for Europe in order to 
prevent its failure. The current system according to which each member state has still 
largely its own fiscal and economic policy will have to develop into a union where 
decision-making and control over fiscal and economic activities and also responsibility 
for the consequences of these activities have been transferred to the competence of EU 
institutions. This assumes the reform of the EU Treaty together with the Convention of 
the Future of Europe. When moving towards this goal it will become clear whether the 
 22 
current regulations effective in certain countries are in such a conflict with the 
adjustments, corrections and additions required on the European level that several 
referendums would have to be carried out. This is particularly important considering the 
strivings for setting up a political union which make it necessary to amend national 
constitutions and therefore require an absolute majority in the parliaments of these 
countries or even referendums. It is quite unsure whether electors agree to the 
delegation of increasingly more competencies to EU institutions.1  
In order to explain the way towards the political union set as the goal, Jean-Claude 
Juncker, President of the EU Commission, prepared the respective memorandum in 
close cooperation with the presidents of the remaining four EU institutions2. This 
outlines the measures which could be taken according to the above-mentioned 
presidents to overcome the crisis in the still immature European Economic and 
Monetary Union encumbered with shortcomings and how to complete the creation of 
this union by the end of 2025.    
According to the group of presidents, structural and institutional framework conditions 
will have to be developed in three directions for the creation of a ’deep, genuine and 
fair’ European Economic and Monetary Union: Creation of a 'genuine', real economic 
union, establishment of a monetary union through the completion of a banking union 
and accelerated formation of a union of capital markets, and formation of a fiscal 
union on the basis of common budgetary policy and giving up sovereignty to a large 
extent. Progress in these three directions would create uno actu also an absolutely 
necessary framework for the creation of a political union as all these four above-
mentioned unions will be formed on the assumption of the existence of the other 
unions. For instance, transfer of competences related to social policy to EU institutions 
would probably be impossible without an actual political union.    
A particularly important condition for a genuinely functioning economic union would 
be the reform of the existing structures in the respective countries in the course of 
several years right at the initial stage, in the direction of comparable, modern systems 
immune to crises. But what actually happened? Political authorities ignored such 
absolute requirement. Their priority from the very beginning was to set up a monetary 
union as soon as possible. Thus euro was introduced as the currency unit without the 
creation of stable preconditions. Thus the current ongoing crisis was already pre-
programmed at that time.  
In order to create ’United States of Europe’ according to the model of the United States 
of America on the basis of unification of the levels of development, economic growth 
and employment and without prolonged crises, the structural and institutional 
conditions in the eurozone should be similar to those in the U.S.A. This would assume 
above all the following: 
• more financial competence to the central government; 
                                                            
1 "The euro is more than just a currency. It is a political and economic project." (Europäische 
Kommission, Nachricht 22/06/2015, Fünf-Präsidenten-Bericht: Die Wirtschaft- und 
Währungunion Europas vollenden, S.4 [European Commission, Communication 22/06/2015), Five 
Presidents‘ Report: Completing European Economic and Monetary Union, p. 4] 
2 EU Council, European Central Bank, Eurogroup, EU Parliament. 
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• centralisation of financial supervision; 
• free financial markets, i.e. deregulation of capital flows, in order to use the capital as 
efficiently as possible; 
• more mobility of labour in the labour markets of the eurozone; 
• less impact of national authorities on the economy. 
The strategy of planned approximation of the levels of development, integrating and 
sustainable economic growth, stability of prices and stable employment consists of three 
main elements:  
→ Reduction of the effect of the state on the economy through liberalisation agenda. 
Further increase in the loan burden will be not allowed for the governments of the 
countries of the Economic and Monetary Union. Instead, they will be required to pay 
their national debt from current incomes. Banks are only allowed to have government 
bonds in limited quantities.     
→ In order to avoid in the future again the situation where an initially banking crisis 
would develop into a government bonds crisis – like it happened in the years after 2007 
– the new arrangements for financial markets provide separation of banks from the 
states. According to the European Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for crisis 
situations and the European Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for banks, the losses 
would be born in the future first by creditors (bail-in) and subsequently by the European 
Single Resolution Fund (SRF) for banking crises. The Member States themselves will 
only bear responsibility according to the principle of subsidiarity – closeness.  
→ Improvement of international competitiveness is the central task. This applies to 
each single Member State to avoid problems within the union due to different initial 
competitive situations. As salaries and wages have no central importance as sources of 
demand or basis of well-being but only for incurring costs, their increases have to be 
restricted by the progress of productivity. As to pension payments, the postponement of 
retirement age should be considered due to longer life expectancies. Capital costs will 
not be taken into account in long-term plans.  
→ Unemployment should be fought on all levels in the framework of comprehensive 
active involvement policy by supporting professional training, further training and 
continuing education, also mobility in the labour markets. Further sufficient financial 
security should be offered when these measures are not successful due to personal 
circumstances. This, however, should only be used if the person clearly wants to 
continue working. On the other hand, protection against lay-offs should be restricted. 
Stimuli should be created for labour with low qualification to induce them to start 
working, such as the earned income tax credit3 used in the U.S.A. for paying additional 
support to low income earners.   
→ It is planned to level off asymmetric cyclical developments in single EU Member 
States through the introduction of the EU unemployment insurance. Also imposing of 
restrictions would be considered to prevent situations where countries in crisis would 
receive longer support payments as unemployment is not always caused only by the 
economic cycles but also by structural factors. Thus the approximation of payment 
flows within the Community should be limited to only sudden losses of jobs and have a 
                                                            
3 EITC, tax credit provided in case of low to medium income, is applied by stages depending on 
the number of children in the family. 
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maximum duration of up to twelve months. Besides, the countries assisted would have 
to co-finance the support to the extent of half of the amount.4 
→ The clause of assumption of liability (no bail out clause) effective in the European 
Union will have to be retained, in principle. Exceptions will have to be clearly regulated 
by strict conditions and have to be unambiguous.5 If rules can be bent, it may prove to 
be a serious obstacle to integration. According to the current experience, such bailout 
measures planned for different needs cause egocentric behaviour of nations (moral 
hazard) and provoke opposition in donor countries. 
→ It is planned to merge the EU financial market, currently fragmented into numerous 
national parts, into a large capital market union and to generally facilitate access to this 
market. In order to avoid the dependence of small and medium-sized enterprises from 
bank loans only and to allow them to seek financing more easily directly from financial 
markets, it is planned to amend directives and make it easier to prepare stock exchange 
prospects, making them shorter, more easily understandable and more specific. The 
bureaucracy of the bonds market will have to be reduced in the future, harmonising 
mandatory auditing of the accounting and financial reports and facilitating the flow of 
risk capital into start-up businesses.         
→ The European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) has been set up to remove 
obstacles from investment activities, favouring of investments in key areas, such as 
infrastructure, education, scientific research and innovation, and establishment of new 
businesses. The Fund is financed from the EU budget and from the funds of the 
European Investment Bank (EIB).  
→ It is debatable whether the regulation of insolvency would have a stabilising effect 
on the insolvency proceedings of countries and consequently it should be included in 
the EMU legal framework. Such a regulation may, however, be used tactically by 
countries and induce them to borrow more lightly – hoping for regular insolvency 
proceedings. This would set the stability of financial markets at risk. Besides, risk 
premiums of interest rates would rise at the appearance of first signs of insolvency and 
an impending insolvency proceeding to such an extent that a country would go 
bankrupt even if it has no excessive debts.  
On the other hand, a country without solid financial management would have to take 
into account risk premiums of their credit interest rates. Thus the establishment of an 
insolvency regulation would have a discouraging effect and would force eurozone 
countries to follow their budgetary discipline. The procedures described would also 
make it possible to evaluate better the risks of recourse on national debt to allow 
creditors to give up debt collection more easily on the basis of rational economic 
considerations in case of sudden insolvency. Thus the insolvency proceeding 
mechanism can be an important instrument for the prevention of crises.  
                                                            
4 But still: as long as labour market policy remains fully within the competence of single Member 
States, it is not possible to exclude that the European unemployment insurance becomes just a 
union of distribution of support payments.  
5 In connection with the clause of assumption of liability in exceptional situations, it is important 
to emphasise specifically in addition to those mentioned also the need to remove structural 
weaknesses, and allowing of exceptions has to be made contingent on following a solid budgetary 
policy in the future. 
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Should the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) check whether the state budget is 
actually in an emergency situation which makes paying off debts unavoidable? 
Ultimately also leaving the eurozone should be possible for a Member State as ultima 
ratio. 
→ In most eurozone countries in Europe the bank deposits have been secured with 
deposit guarantee schemes to the extent of 100,000 euros per each depositor and bank. 
As a result of such national regulations the quality of each single guarantee depends on 
the financial capacity of the eurozone country where the bank is located. This, however, 
generally contradicts the principles of the common monetary area. For this purpose the 
introduction of a common guarantee system (European deposit insurance scheme) is 
discussed, the more so that such a system would have lower costs for Europe. This 
would create a fund to which all countries of the union would make payments and from 
which services could be provided to bank clients in case of losses. Such a common 
guarantee for deposits in Europe would become the third column of the banking union 
next to the independent banking supervision mechanism of the eurozone introduced at 
the end of 2014 (Single Supervisory Mechanism, SSM) and the European common 
crisis management mechanism (Single Resolution Mechanism, SRM) effective from 
January 2015.  
→ As the financial world in eurozone has practically no borders between countries any 
more, it was logical to centralise banking supervision. But it would have been more 
reasonable to transfer the supervision of banks to some neutral institution. This in its 
turn would have required the respective amendment of the EU Treaty. It is certainly 
questionable whether it would all have been possible in the course of such a short time. 
Instead, the task was hurriedly imposed on the European Central Bank. Such a double 
function of an authority of monetary policy and simultaneously a supervisory authority 
will create a risk that a conflict of interests may affect the monetary policy. Certainly, a 
need for a so-to-say clean solution still remains.  
The current persisting crisis of the European Economic and Monetary Union makes the 
need to carry out a sustainable reform increasingly urgent. Therefore it is important for 
the respective common institutions to reach the results as soon as possible. 
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